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Your Employees:  The Front Line in Cyber Security 
What happens if you lose trust in the systems on which you rely?  If the displays 
and dashboards tell you everything is operating normally but, with your own 
eyes, you can see that this is not the case?  This is what apparently happened 
with the Stuxnet virus attack on the Iranian nuclear programme in 2010. 
While the technological effects of the Stuxnet virus on the Iranian nuclear 
programme have been widely reported, what hasn’t been examined is how the 
attack seemed to have a subsidiary aim of making the Iranians distrust their own 
instruments and to make them doubt what they were seeing.  This was arguably 
the first major attack on an industrial control system from a hostile threat agent 
but, as we can see, the impact went beyond physical destruction – it led to doubt 
and mistrust in the system to the extent that the Iranians ended up putting 
people in the plant to physically watch and report back on what was happening. 
While Stuxnet seems to have been a nation state attack on a system, we have 
seen insider attacks on SCADA systems in the past.  The first major incident of 
this nature was an attack on radio-controlled sewage equipment in Queensland 
in 2000.  In this case the motivation for the attack was revenge.  A disaffected ex-
employee decided to get even and by issuing radio commands to the equipment 
that he was familiar with (and may well have helped to install) he caused 
800,000 litres of raw sewage to flood parks, rivers and even the grounds of a 
Hyatt Regency hotel.   
 
The number of cyber attacks on SCADA and manufacturing plants is fortunately 
still low but the potential scale of impact has focused attention on how we can 
protect such systems.  The emphasis has been on addressing technical 
vulnerabilities.  Increasingly there is technology in such plants that is connected 
to the Internet (usually for maintenance purposes) and this is likely to increase 
with the proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices (for example, building 
management systems).  Coupled with this is the recognition that many back end 
or Operational Technology (OT) systems were never designed with security in 
mind.  These systems are often difficult to patch or update and it may not be 
practical to take them offline to patch vulnerabilities.  The OT may also be 
connected to the Enterprise System (ES) that runs the business side of the 
organisation.  This gives an attacker a pathway from one side of the business to 
the other, safety-critical, side of the operation.   
Last year saw at least two further attacks that are worth mentioning, although 
there is relatively little detailed information available.  In Norway, a number of 
oil and energy companies were targeted.  Statoil were under attack for three 
days when their Intrusion Detection Systems flagged up that rogue code was 
being downloaded onto their system.  A second attack last December was carried 
out on a German steel plant.  It seems that hackers gained access to control 
systems in the plant so that parts of the plant failed and a furnace couldn’t be 
switched off. 
 
 
The Insider Threat 
Let’s cast our eyes back over the attacks that have occurred.  The attack on the 
German steel plant seems to have been caused by a spear phishing attack.  These 
are targeted attacks, usually delivered via an email that has been personalised in 
some way.  The employee receives an email that is specific to them but when 
they open it they unwittingly launch some rogue code onto the network.  
Another way of carrying out this type of attack is via a USB stick dropped, 
apparently dropped by accident, in a car park.  Someone finds the USB stick and 
in an effort to be helpful (or just curious) plugs it into a computer to see if there’s 
some indication of ownership.  In the process the rogue code jumps from the USB 
stick onto the network. 
It seems likely that Stuxnet got onto the Iranian nuclear system in a similar way.  
In this case though rather than a USB stick the code jumped from a laptop used 
by a maintenance engineer.  The virus had got onto the laptop and the laptop 
was then connected to the system, allowing the virus the opportunity to jump off 
the laptop and onto the system it was programmed to attack.   
Generally then it seems that one of the easiest ways to get malware onto process 
control systems is to exploit the links that are made between these systems and 
the Internet – or where the Enterprise System is connected to the Operational 
Technology.   
Practical Steps to Manage the Risk 
In an ideal world there should be an air gap between the Enterprise System and 
Operational Technology, between critical systems and the Internet.  Sometimes, 
however, this simply isn’t practical or, even if there is a policy against such 
connections employees will inadvertently or maliciously bridge these air gaps.  
So, what can you do to minimise the risk of this happening? 
If you have a strong safety culture and you’ve tried using the model that support 
it as a way to improve your security culture you may have come across some 
difficulties.  One of the key differences between safety and cyber security is that 
the riskiness of cyber security behaviours depends a great deal on the context in 
which they are carried out.   
For example, the first step in changing organisational behaviour is identifying the 
specific behaviour that you want to change.  From a safety perspective this could 
be holding onto a handrail while you go down some stairs.  This is a very specific 
behavioural requirement.  An equivalent behaviour from a security perspective 
might be locking your computer screen when you are away from your desk, or 
not using a USB stick (and you can physically prevent the latter by blocking USB 
ports).  Unfortunately though, many security behaviours are far harder to define 
in such a specific way – which in turn means it is more difficult for employees to 
understand exactly what they should do.   
Hopefully it is easy to see from what we’ve discussed so far that not opening 
phishing emails would be a good security behaviour to establish.  It is, however, 
difficult to define a specific behaviour that will stop employees falling victim to 
phishing attacks.  If it was obvious that an email was a phishing email an 
employee wouldn’t open it in the first place, but the skill in launching a phishing 
attack is that the email will look innocuous.  If you ask employees not to open 
emails if they don’t recognise the sender address or if they have other suspicions 
about it, then you could bring your organisation to a halt with important emails 
that aren’t opened.  Employees will, quite rightly, want to know what criteria to 
use for judging the validity of an email, and how long will you expect them to 
spend on making a decision about whether to open it or not?  As you can see this 
is not a straightforward behavioural proposition. 
So how can we minimise the risk of employees opening a phishing email?  One 
way that is quite popular at the moment is to use a software tool that launches 
phishing emails against your employees but under your control.  This will test 
whether your employees are likely to fall prey to a phishing attack.  This sounds 
like a good idea and is fairly easy to do, however, there can be significant 
drawbacks.   
Firstly, if you phish employees and they fall prey to it (and perhaps even get a 
telling off as a result, or, at best, some remedial security training) they may be 
less interested in trying to help you improve security.  Nobody likes to get things 
wrong and many people feel that they’ve been tricked in this situation.  The 
other danger is that they will start to exhibit signs of ‘learned helplessness’.  This 
is a psychological condition where an individual feels that there is little point in 
trying to do the right thing because they just can’t win.  At best you may get 
apathy around security behaviours and at worst, outright rejection. 
Turning Employees Into A Security Asset 
As with all technological approaches to solving an organisational problem the 
difference between success and failure depends on what sits around the 
technology.  If you are going to use a software tool that enables you to phish your 
employees then it should only be one part of your behavioural change 
programme and you need to consider the following: 
(i) Get your employees onside first by explaining what you’re doing and why.   
The most productive way to do this is to have an open dialogue with them about 
security issues – and by dialogue I mean just that, speaking but also listening and 
exchanging ideas.  What is the perception of cyber security risk in your 
organisation – do some employees think that cyber security requirements are 
over-hyped?  Are parts of your organisation vulnerable to the ‘culture of the 
expert’ – you probably have very talented engineers and scientists in your 
organisations but they may also think they know better than you do about 
security.  You might believe that you know how your employees think but your 
first step should be getting out there and asking them, because it is very likely 
that you will get some opinions that you would never have second guessed. 
(ii) Plan very carefully what you are going to do when employees open the 
phishing emails that you send.   There will probably be a temptation to punish 
them in some way and insist that they do some further awareness training.  This 
should be the last resort.  The majority of employees want to do the right thing 
and most believe that they can make a contribution to organisational security.  
You need to foster this.  The messages that you put out at this stage need to 
demonstrate that you understand that.  Rather than a security expert talking 
down to an employee (in a kind of parent/child relationship) you should be 
having a peer-to-peer conversation.  You are aiming to build the employee’s 
feelings of ‘self-efficacy’ - this is the belief that they have in their own abilities to 
successfully manage a situation.   
(iii) Recognise good behaviour when you see it.  Security practitioners are 
often very quick to discipline employees for poor security behaviours but are 
less likely to praise or offer rewards for good security behaviours.  This could be 
something as simple as an email of recognition to the employee’s line manager.   
(iv) Ideally what you are aiming for is a well thought through campaign where 
the launch of the phishing tool only forms one part.  The other parts will be made 
up the dialogue that you have with employees where you explain the problems 
with phishing, the impact it could have and what you propose to do but, in turn, 
you also listen to their thoughts and ideas for how to address the situation.  You 
will have a plan for those employees who fall prey to your phishing attacks that 
will increase their self-efficacy rather than leading them into learned 
helplessness.  Finally, when employees exhibit good security behaviours (for 
example, when they report phishing emails to you for investigation) you should 
have a system for rewarding and recognising their behaviour. 
The Future  
While there have been relatively few attacks to date on industrial controls 
systems we have no reason to assume that this will continue.  When we cast 
forward over the next five years analysts’ predictions suggest that the attack 
surface will increase significantly.  Gartner believes that by 2018, 6 billion 
‘things’ will be connected to the Internet and a number of these will be able to 
request support for themselves (we already see examples of this with security 
systems that alert a security company that an alarm has been tripped).  This 
means that the number of security events and attacks will rise and there will be a 
corresponding pressure on resources, both technological and human to manage 
this risk. 
In short, the attack surface is getting bigger and technology cannot handle all the 
attacks that are being registered.  We can use technology to prevent some of 
these through surveillance and monitoring but there is more we can do.  Firstly, 
we can try to limit the instances of employees inadvertently causing a security 
breach and secondly, we can harness the goodwill and aptitude of our employees 
to take a more active role in preventing malicious attacks. 
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